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Abstract
We use a set of established growth models, which simultaneously include
human capital and R&D, to show that the effect of mortality rate in
human capital accumulation is quantitatively more important than the
effect of perfectly guaranteed patents on research. First, we show that
the effect of mortality rate on human capital accumulation productivity
may explain differences in growth paths and development levels across
countries, accounting for the main features of economic development of
the industrialized world in the last two centuries. Then, we explicitly
compare the two types of expropriation (mortality rate and uncertainty
in property rights).
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1 Introduction
Different paths of growth have led to very different levels of GDP per capita
even among developed countries. This has recently been attributed to differ-
ences in institutions between countries. We follow the suggestion of Douglas
North (1994), who, in his Nobel Lecture, refers to economic growth theory
arguing that “when applied to economic history and development it focused
on technological development and more recently human capital investment but
ignored the incentive structure embodied in institutions that determine the ex-
tent of societal investment in those factors”. He emphasized that “the speed
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of economic change is a function of the rate of learning, but the direction of
that change is a function of the expected payoffs to acquiring different kinds of
knowledge”.
This paper analyzes the effect of different types of incentives in a standard
model with physical capital, human capital and R&D. In particular, the econ-
omy evolves from a neoclassical physical capital model to a Lucas human capital
model and finally to an R&D model, as in Funke and Strulik (2000). We are
interested in a comparison between human capital and R&D enhancing institu-
tions. For that, we compare the influence of the sensivity of human capital to
mortality rate (or of mortality rate itself) with the influence of property rights
on ideas on growth and development. We think these are the most important
“incentives” studied in the literature for each of the most well-known engines of
growth (human capital and R&D).
First, we mimic the recent evolution of the developed world, following the
industrial revolution, being particularly concerned with the transitions between
stages of economic growth, in which agents face incentives to invest in different
assets, evaluating the importance of the mortality rate effect on human capital
accumulation and growth.
Then, we want to compare the effect of mortality rate (through human
capital) with the effect of property rights (through R&D) on economic growth
and development. These have been the most cited types of expropriation to
explain different growth paths. For example, Jones (2001), argued that the
existence of protected patents for R&D was the single most important factor in
driving an industrial revolution. On the influence of Mortality Rate, there are
three cited channels through which it affects human capital accumulation:
• a decrease in the mortality rate and the simultaneous decrease in fertility
tend to increase parental investment in each child - the parental investment
channel - (Zhang et al. 2001, 2003 and Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000);
• mortality rate is correlated with the health status of the population: a
decrease in mortality induces increases in the human capital quality and
thus accumulation of human capital becomes more productive; this is
related to the Cost of Illness approach - the health channel - (Bloom,
Canning and Sevilla, 2001 and Croper, 2000, p.336);
• high mortality rate reduces expected value of future returns from educa-
tion - the returns channel - (Meltzer, 1992 and Preston, 1980, cited in
Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000). Preston (1980) reported a small effect.
We do not study reverse causality between human capital accumulation and
the decline of mortality rate nor its effect on aggregate savings.1
1According to Zhang et al. (2003), there are two opposite effects on savings: lower mor-
tality tends to increase savings because people want to smooth consumption throughout more
periods and it reduces savings because lower longevity reduces accidental bequests. These
authors argue that the first effect dominates in poor countries and the latter in the rich
countries.
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There is some historical evidence for the USA, supported by Haines (2001),
who pointed out that the sustained mortality transition only began about the
1870s. The author also argues that thereafter the decline of urban mortality
proceeded faster than in rural places, assisted by significant public works im-
provements and advances in public health and eventually medical science. The
negative correlation between current mortality rate and future economic growth
can be seen in the following figures for several countries. The last panel shows
the correlation between school enrollment and life expectancy in the USA.
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Figure 1. Correlations between Mortality, Human Capital and Economic
Growth
Definitions: e0 is Life Expectancy at birth, POD is Probability of Dying before 1
year old and gy is per capita growth rate of GDP. Economic Growth for Netherlands,
Sweden and United Kingdom are for the periods 1700-1820 (which corresponds to
1750 in the figure), 1820-1870 (1800), 1870-1913 (1850), 1913-1950 (1900) and
1950-1973 (1950). For the USA, life expectancy is in the indicated year and economic
growth rate is in the following period (e.g. 1910 and 1910-1920).
Sources: Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) for POD, Maddison (1995 and 2001) for growth rates
and Costa and Steckel (1995) for e0 and School Enrollments (these last two variables
were constructed as ranks by year).
Mortality has also been used as an empirical instrument for current insti-
tutions and explains a large part of existing productivity differences between
countries (Acemoglu et al., 2001). This author argues that low mortality rates
showed by settlers in colonies influence the creation of protective institutions to
the accumulation of different types of capital and potentially to R&D.
There is an established effect of the mortality decline in economic growth
through human capital accumulation: this will be an assumption in our model,
which will be quantitatively evaluated.
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As we focus on the quantitative properties of the model, the treatment of
institutions in this paper is simple and of reduced-form, as for instance, in Jones
(2001).
To sum up, this paper adds to the literature the simultaneous study of the
impact of two different types of expropriation mechanisms on quite standard
endogenous growth models with transition mechanisms (as in Funke and Strulik,
2000) between them. It also simulates modern times with the model, showing
that the effect of the mortality rate on human capital accumulation productivity
is important to mimic the main features of the development process of the last
two centuries. It also attempts to evaluate the role of the State in building in
the incentives structure. This is important concerning the recent discovery that
“state antiquity” contributes significantly to the explanation of differences in
growth rates and is a good instrument for institutional quality, as Bockstette et
al. (2002) had argued.
In Section 2, we present the benchmark model. In Section 3, we describe the
different stages and analyze the influence of mortality rate and property rights
on ideas in the transitory steady-states. In Section 4, we present a comparison
between predictions from the model and from economic history. In section 5, we
describe the model dynamics. In Section 6, we explicitly compare the two types
of expropriation. Then, in Section 7, we evaluate the role of Government as tax
collector to improve or enforce institutions. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.
2 The model
The Model builds on Funke and Strulik (2000) and adds two main features: (1)
demographic settings and (2) property rights.2
2.1 Engines of Growth and Institutions
Institutions are understood as society features that protect engines of growth
from being expropriated. The features studied here are mortality rate, as an
expropriation mechanism of human capital and erosion of property rights over
new ideas, as an expropriation mechanism over R&D.
Individuals may spend part of their human capital, HH , on development of
skills. This non-market activity is described by a production function of the
Uzawa (1965) - Lucas (1988) type, which is extended to include the idea that
the mortality rate decreases the productivity of human capital production:
·
H= (ξ − γd)HH (1)
with productivity parameter ξ > 0, the mortality rate d and the sensitivity
of human capital accumulation to the mortality rate γ. The mortality rate is
2In different extensions, we introduced a tax over assets and spillovers. Main differences
are presented in appendix. Results are presented in Sections 4.3 to 6
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introduced in a way that directly reduces human capital productivity.3 This as-
sumption links the effect of the mortality rate with human capital accumulation
through its health and parental investment channels.4 The effect of malnutrition
or chronic disease, such as asthma or bronchitis, on the children’s productivity
in schools are quite appealing examples. Thus the sensitivity γ may be corre-
lated with other incentives to accumulate human capital (other than mortality
but related with it) in the economy, say, public investment on educational in-
frastructure as primary schools or medication spread, which lower morbidity.
As formal education becomes cheaper, individuals may become less responsive
to the mortality rate. As medication evolves and becomes more widespread, dis-
eases become less effective in decreasing human capital accumulation, as they
cause a decrease in the inabilities related to chronic diseases. Note that γ = 0
imply that mortality rate does not influence the accumulation of human capital,
which means that institutions such as schooling and health care can be so good
that the level of mortality does not imply lower productivity in accumulating
skills.
A growth accounting approach to this function suggests that human capital
is determined by the quantity of human capital, HH , by productivity ξ, and
by the quality of human capital, −γd. Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1993) show
that productivity influence on educational output growth is quite low in the
period between 1948 and 1986 in the USA, but labor quantity and quality have
a greater influence. In an exploratory analysis, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla
(2001) show that accounting for productivity differences across countries, life
expectancy has a significantly positive effect on GDP per capita growth and
decreases the significance and influence of schooling and experience. According
to these authors, work experience is insufficient to account for cross-countries
development differences. Although these do not constitute definite evidence
to support the belief that these factors are more important than productivity
strictu sensu, there is sufficient evidence to argue that these factors are crucial.
Thus, we suggest that the parameter ξ (strictu sensu productivity of human
capital in the education sector) is not particularly different between countries
and throughout time.
With this parameterization, changes in mortality given the sensitivity, or in
the sensitivity given the mortality have exactly the same effect. We will use
only the sensitivity, given that we want to study the influence of institutions
and mortality can be given by historical data. Below, we will show equivalence
between this approach and others that evaluate the impact of the mortality rate.
3Another possible way to introduce mortality is
·
H= ξHH − γdH, which also guarantees
the existence of steady state. It can be shown that this possibility implies exactly the same
growth rate of human capital as the adopted one, changing only the share of human capital
in the education sector.
4Its relationship with parental investment is better seen calculating the effort in human
capital accumulation uH (given below after Table 1), which depends negatively on γ and d.
Although there are a few other ways to think of an impact of mortality on human capital
through the returns channel (see, for instance Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000)), our parameter γ
also works through wages, in a way that is explained below.
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Production of a new intermediate good requires the invention of a new
blueprint. For emphasis of the following exposure, we assume that output of
new ideas is determined solely by the aggregate knowledge employed in the
R&D-sector and excludes spillovers or duplication effects that were present, for
instance, in Jones (1995). We will discuss below the effects of a setting with
spillovers. The production function of new ideas is made according to:
·
n= ²Hn (2)
with efficiency parameter ² > 0 and human capital affected to R&D activities,
Hn.
To consider property rights, we want to introduce uncertainty about whether
the value of patents will be guaranteed forever. A tractable way to model
the gradual erosion of monopoly power (suggested in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995), p.223) is to assume that goods transform from monopolized to compet-
itive with a probability that is generated from a Poisson process.5 Thus, if a
good is invented at time t and is initially monopolized, the probability of it
still being monopolized at the future date τ is e−p(τ−t), in which pdT is the
probability that the good becomes competitive in the next interval dT . Let υt
denote the expected value of innovation, defined by
υt =
∫ ∞
t
e−[R(τ)−R(t)+p(τ−t)]pi(τ)dτ, where R(τ) =
∫ t
0
r(τ)dτ (3)
An economy without property rights laws and enforcement rules corresponds to
setting p equal to +∞. In this case the economy cannot enter into an R&D
stage simply because monopoly is never guaranteed, and it will never be. Thus,
there are no profits to compensate for R&D costs. Taking into account the cost
of innovation as implied by (2), free entry conditions in R&D are defined as
follows:
w/² = υ and Hn > 0,
.
n> 0 or (4)
w/² > υ and Hn = 0,
.
n= 0 (5)
Finally, no-arbitrage requires that the valorization of the patent plus profits
less the probability of erosion of monopoly power is equal to investing resources
in the riskless asset:
·
υ +pi − pυ = rυ ⇔
·
υ
υ
= r + p− pi/υ. (6)
5This is exogenous (as in Jones (2001)). This erosion of monopoly power is also a way to
study time-limited patents, using a certainty equivalence approach: say that a monetary unit
applied in an uncertain patent has to yield the same returns as the same amount applied in
a time-limited patent. Thus
∫∞
0 e
−(r+p)tdt =
∫ T
0 e
−rtdt.
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2.2 Other technologies and market structure
The output of the final good depends on the physical capital (K), human capital
affected to final good production (HY ) and differentiated goods (D) using a
Cobb-Douglas technology:
Y = A1KβDηH
1−β−η
Y β, η > 0, β + η < 1 (7)
The index of intermediates is represented by the usual Dixit and Stiglitz
formulation:
D =
[∫ n
0
xαi di
]1/α
(8)
where n denotes the number of available varieties and xi is the quantity of
the intermediate good i that is produced with the final good, in a one-to-one
proportion. The elasticity of substitution between varieties is ε = 1/(1−α) > 1
with α < 1. Physical capital is only used for the production of final goods. For
simplicity, we neglect physical capital depreciation, which leads to the economy
resource constraint:
Y = C+
·
K +
∫ n
0
xidi (9)
With population growth, we must re-write previous equations in per capita
terms. The growth rate of population is exogenous and equal to
·
P= bnP , in
which bn is the “net birth rate”, that is, the rate of newborns less the rate of
mortality. We will denote per capita variables as the respective lower cases.
Growth rates of per capita variables are the growth rate of aggregated variables
less “net birth rate” or the growth rate of population.
The market for final good and its factors are perfectly competitive and its
price is normalized to one. Profit maximization, taking r, pD and w as given,
implies the following inverse-demand functions:
r =
βY
K
, (10)
pD =
ηY
D
, (11)
and
w =
(1− β − η)Y
HY
, (12)
where pD represents the price index for intermediates.
Each firm in the differentiated goods sector owns a patent for selling its vari-
ety xi. Producers act under monopolistic competition and maximize operating
profits
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pii = (pi − 1)xi, (13)
The variable pi denotes the price of an intermediate and 1 is the unit cost of Y .
From profit maximization in the intermediate goods sector, facing elasticity of
demand εx = 1/(1− α), each firm charges a price
pi = 1/α. (14)
With identical technologies and symmetric demand, the quantity supplied is the
same for all goods, xi = x. Hence, equation (8) simplifies to
D = n1/αx. (15)
From pDD = pxn together with equations (14) and (15) we obtain the total
quantity of intermediates employed as
X = xn = αηY. (16)
After insertion of equations (14) and (16) into (13), profits can be rewritten
as a function of aggregate output and the number of existing firms:
pi = (1− α)ηY/n. (17)
Before we proceed with the analysis we compute some equations that will
be useful at the three stages of development that we will analyze. Insertion of
equation (16) in equation (9) simplifies the resource constraint to
·
K= (1− αη)Y − C (18)
and insertion of (15) and (16) in the production function (7) gives the output
growth rate in per capita terms:
(1− η)gy = βgk + [1− α
α
]ηgn + (1− β − η)(gu1 + gh) (19)
where u1 = hY /h is the proportion of knowledge allocated to final good produc-
tion and where the growth rate of variable z is denoted by gz. Log-differentiation
of equations (10) and (12) provides
gr = gy − gk (20)
gw = gy − (gu1 + gh) (21)
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2.3 Households
Each individual allocates his knowledge between the different activities in the
economy, such that:
h = hH + hn + hY (22)
Individuals earn wages, w, per unit of employed labor (h − hH) and re-
turns, r, per unit of individual wealth. They maximize intertemporal utility
Ut =
∫∞
t
c1−θt −1
1−θ e
−(ρ−bn)(τ−t)dτ , where ρ > 0 denotes the time preference rate,
subject to
·
a= w(h− hH) + (r − bn)a− c and to the per capita version of (1).6
Using the control variables c > 0 and hH ≥ 0 and the state variables a and h,
we write the current value Hamiltonian
Ξ =
c1−θt − 1
1− θ + λ1(w(h− hH) + (r − b
n)a− c) + λ2((ξ − γd)hH − bnh)
and obtain from its first order conditions, the following expressions for con-
sumption and wage growth rates:
·
c
c
=
r − ρ
θ
⇔
·
C
C
=
r − ρ
θ
+ bn (23)
hH > 0 and
·
w
w
= (r − ξ + γd) or hH = 0 (24)
Equation (23) is the standard Ramsey rule. Equation (24) indicates that
the growth rate of wages must be sufficiently high compared to the interest rate
to ensure investment in human capital.
In the following sections we describe the evolution of the economy from a
Cass-Koopmans model to a human capital accumulation model and then to an
R&D model of endogenous growth. First, we will present the steady-states of
transitory stages and the final steady state. Then, we present equations that
characterize the model dynamics and that we use to simulate the model.
3 The evolution of the Economy through stages
and the impact of Mortality and Property-
Rights
In the steady state, there are no factor movements between sectors, which im-
plies that gu1 = 0, and we face a constant real interest rate (gr = 0). Using (20)
6Although individuals have finite lives, we consider an immortal extended family that
makes intergenerational transfers based on altruism (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995:60))
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and (21) in (19), we get gy = 1−αα
η
1−η−β gn + gh. In the first stage, we assume
gn = gh = 0, which also gives zero growth rate of GDP per capita in the steady
state.7 In the second stage gn = 0 but gH > 0. Substituting gh with gy − gw
(from (21)) and gw by the value given in (24), we obtain the interest rate in this
transitory equilibrium. Using (18), we know that gy = gc and by (23) we reach
gy in this transitory equilibrium, which is given by gy = ξ−γd−ρθ . Finally, in the
third stage, by (2) and the fact that in equilibrium there are no factor movements
between sectors, we find that the growth rate of aggregate human capital is equal
to the growth rate of the number of varieties in the steady state (gn = gH). Thus
(19) may be re-written as gy = (1 + 1−αα
η
1−η−β )gh +
1−α
α
η
1−η−β b
n. Using again
(21) held gy in the steady state. Results for the two transitory steady-states
and for the steady state are summarized in the next table.
Table 1: Steady-states of transitory stages and final Steady-state
1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage
gy = gk = gc = 0 gy = gk = gc = gh = gy = gk = gc =
= ξ−γd−ρθ =
(ξ−γd−ρ)(1+A2)+bn
(θ−1)+θA2
gh = gn = 0, by definition gn = 0, by definition gh + bn = gn
= (ξ−γd−ρ)A2+θA2b
n
(θ−1)+θA2
Note: A2 =
α(1−β−η)
(1−α)η .
It is worth noting that although mortality rate (γ, d) directly influences
steady-state growth rates, the erosion of monopoly power (p) for new ideas does
not.
In the next few lines, we explain why the mortality rate influence can be
seen through the different channels that were pointed out in the literature:
the health channel; the parental investment channel; and the returns channel,
the first of which was discussed earlier, when the human capital accumula-
tion function was presented. We can use the expression for gh to calculate
the effort in human capital accumulation (uH = hHh ). This is useful for con-
firming that this function also describes the parental investment channel, as
was claimed above, according to which mortality affects human capital accu-
mulation because investment in each child increases when mortality decreases.
Thus, in the second stage uH = 1θ
(
1− ρξ−γd
)
+ b
n
ξ−γd and in the third stage
uH = A2(θ−1)+θA2
[(
1− ρξ−γd
)
+ θb
n
ξ−γd
]
. The first term in each of the expressions
represents the individual effort and the second term represents the effort that
results from exogenous population growth. This shows that the individual ef-
fort depends negatively on the mortality rate. These expressions are, in fact,
quite similar to expression (14) in Zhang et al. (2001), who treat fertility as
exogenous, in which parental investment in children’s human capital is given as
7Steady-state in this stage can be defined as a poverty-trap.
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a function of fertility (with a negative effect), of the discount factor and of the
human capital share in the final production.
Moreover, the parameter γ also affects human capital accumulation through
returns in the future. In this model, the way of analyzing this effect is to
calculate the effect of this crucial parameter on the growth rate of wages. Let
us concentrate on the steady-state expression gw = r− (ξ−γd) = (ξ−γd)+θb
n−ρ
(θ−1)+θA2 .
As ∂gw∂γ < 0, the human capital sensitivity to the mortality rate has a negative
influence on the growth rate of wages. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) uses an
alternative approach to measure the impact of mortality rate on human capital
accumulation in an overlapping generations model, which consists of considering
a probability of being alive at each date (given by a Poisson process), which
increases the discount rate. Furthermore, it uses the assumption of perfectly
competitive annuity business, which implies that lenders will account for the
probability of each borrower dying in calculating their marginal cost.8
In conclusion, we see that our parameter summarizes the overall effect of the
mortality rate on human capital accumulation through the three channels that
have been cited to link both phenomena. In the next section we describe the
model dynamics.
4 An Historical Interpretation
Besides other possible “economic histories”, we think that this article offers
a good explanation the history of the developed world, beginning in a stage
described by a Cass-Koopmans model, where growth can be explained exoge-
nously (either with a temporary or permanent growth rate of technology) to a
human-capital accumulation model and then to an R&D model.9 This period
can be characterized by the following main facts:
1. Permanent growth had began in England after 1760 (Crafts, 1995).
2. Development can be divided into three stages, according to investment
in different assets. Researchers have supported that first there is an in-
creasing role for human capital and then an increasing role for R&D. Each
stage brings up the economic growth rate (Maddison, 1995; Crafts, 1995,
1996; Pereira, 2003, Sφrensen, 1999).
3. The last R&D period has been the lengthiest (Crafts 1995, Maddison,
2001).
8It can be shown that their approach is qualitatively similar to ours. Consider that d is
the probability of dying at each unit time (ρ in their notation), then e−dt is the probability
of being alive at each unit time. Consider also that the net interest rate will be r + d. Then
the growth rate of wages is equal to r + d − ξ, which compares with our equation (24). The
growth rate of consumption is given by our (23). Thus the effect of d is qualitatively equal to
the effect of γd in our model.
9Before the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey model, the economy is described as a Malthusian
economy (Hansen and Prescott, 2002 and Pereira, 2003).
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4. Mortality decline is related with human capital investment and growth
(Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002 and Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000, among others).
The last two periods can be easily identified in the data (see for instance
Sφrensen, 1999). However, support for an initial stage in which the economy
engine of growth is only physical capital is more difficult to obtain. Nevertheless,
Crafts’ (1995) growth accounting for the British industrial revolution shows little
role for human capital and TFP in the period from 1760 to 1780. Moreover,
macroinventions, best seen as exogenous technological shocks, were crucial to
the beginning of economic growth in the British Industrial Revolution, which
excludes endogenous growth models from the explanation of the first industrial
times. We first admit that this was the case as, for instance, in Galor and Moav
(2003).
Also controversial in economic history is the division between periods.
The first division consists of setting a time interval in which human capital
growth began. In a growth accounting exercise performed by Crafts (1995)
human capital contribution rose from 17% (from a 10% growth rate) in 1760-
1780 period to 26% (from a 20% growth rate) and 30% (35% growth rate) in the
following periods (1780-1831 and 1831-1873), respectively. However, according
to this author, male literacy only begins to rise after 1801 and maintenance
or even decrease of skills-per-worker occurred in the early British industrial
revolution. It is also worth noting that the high and volatile mortality rate until
1750 in England (and consequently slow population growth) could have played a
role as an incentive to begin the accumulation of human capital in the next stage
through increasing wages (evidence is from Mokyr, 1990). This incentive can be
seen in equation (24), with r = ρ.10 Crafts (1996), citing Mokyr, argued that
microinventions, seen as adaptations of macroinventions to production, led by
learning-by-doing practices, constituted the comparative advantage of Britain:
“Given that learning within a particular technology is bounded, sustaining faster
growth requires both new inventions” - the macroinventions - “and an ability to
transfer learning to new technologies” - the microinventions (Crafts, 1996). So
human capital contribution to growth, given that we argued for the existence
of a first physical capital stage, began between 1780 and 1800. Thus, the first
period length seems to last about 20 to 40 years, according to the belief of
economic historians.
The second division consists of setting a time interval to initial investments
in R&D. The upper bound for this interval is between 1870 and 1890, a period in
which historians date the beginning of the American industrial revolution, which
is undoubtedly more R&D-intensive than the British one, as was recognized by
Maddison (1995). The lower bound depends on the answer to the following
question: is there a scope for an endogenous R&D explanation for the British
Industrial Revolution? Arguments in favor of an explanation based on R&D
10Some authors cited in Lindert (1994) found that wages of skilled workers had increased
when compared with non-skilled between 1750 and 1790 in some English regions. It is after
1740 that life expectancy shows an increasing trend, but it is only after 1800 that this trend
had not been affected by dramatic falls in some years (Schofield, 1994).
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endogenous growth models, at least for the final years of the British industrial
revolution, are strong. As Crafts (1996) supported, “Britain had an unusual
proficiency for importing ideas and improving upon them; government policy
recognized the importance of (...) technology transfer. A striking feature of
the early 19th-century Great Britain was the mushrooming of associations that
were designed to spread technological progress”.
In conclusion, we can set an interval between 1780-1800 and 1820-90 for the
human capital accumulation stage, which means that this period may last for
20 to 110 years. The corresponding lengthier period for the third innovative
stage is according to the view of Crafts (1995, 1996).
Another interesting feature of the model is that per capita GDP growth rate
depends positively on the population’s rate of growth. This comes from the
use of human capital in research and increasing returns to scale in the final
product (Y) when the number of varieties is included (1+ η
(
1−α
α
)
> 1). As the
population grows, more people are employed in R&D activities, increasing the
number of varieties available for each family. This is also found by Jones (2001)
and is empirically consistent, as Kremer (1993) has shown. This differs from
this author’s view in one aspect: this model does not predict a link between the
initial level of population and economic growth. This feature fits, for instance,
the episode of the second industrial revolution in the USA, where growth was
not related with initial population but with massive entrance of immigrants,
i.e., population growth.11 Slow population growth (1.6% per year between 1870
and 1900) may also explain the decreasing performance of England after 1870.
Increasing growth rates of GDP per capita throughout stages of development,
due to the accumulation of human capital (between the first and the second
stage) and due to a research-effect (from the second to the third stage) are also
in line with reported data: this effect occurred in the United Sates, which showed
a per capita growth rate of GDP of 2.2% between 1980 and 1998, compared with
a rate of 1.3% between 1820 and 1870.12
The model fits with this historical description. The Cass-Koopmans model
describes the first period (with a length of nearly 20 years). This is a period
where “endogenous” economic growth has not taken place, but Macroinventions
(seen as exogenous) may lead to permanent but slow growth. After Microinven-
tions took advantage in England hand to hand with increasing literacy/training
and demographic transition (declining mortality rates), the economy begins to
resemble as a Lucas-type human capital model (with a length of between 20
and 110 years). After that, TFP contribution permanently increased either in
UK and in USA and the economy can better be described as a semi-endogenous
model of R&D with a positive contribution of population growth to economic
growth.
11The population in the USA was near below 5 million in 1800. However, this number rose
to 40 million in 1870. Between 1870 and 1900, population in the USA had grown 2.9% per
year. This simply means that the USA doubled its population between these years.
12However, there is also the theoretical possibility of having higher per capita growth rates
in the second stage than in the third with decreasing population.
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At this stage, we can say that steady-states of transitory stages, final steady-
state and the qualitative evolution of the economy throughout stages of devel-
opment are close to what is described by economic history for this period. This
was our first test of the model.
In the next section we describe the model dynamics.
5 The Model Dynamics
We will now evaluate the length of these periods according to the proposed
model. For that, we first present equations that describe the dynamics of the
model and that we use in simulation (Section 4.1). Then we explain the simu-
lation procedure (Section 4.2) and finally, we present the results of simulation
(Section 4.3).
5.1 The Evolution of the Economy through stages
5.1.1 The first stage or the Cass-Koopmans Model
We summarize the equations that describe the dynamic in this stage, in which
the economy only invests in physical capital. Let C/K denote the consumption-
capital ratio. Because the economy is investing only in physical capital, from
(20) and (19), using (10) and (18), we can write gr as:
gr = −1− β − η1− η
(
1− αη
β
r − C/K
)
(25)
and from the definition of C/K, using (10), (23) and (18):
gC/K =
(
1/θ − 1− αη
β
)
r + C/K − ρ/θ + bn (26)
It is worth noting that the economy begins investing only in physical capital,
but due to decreasing returns to capital, we can see from (20) and (21) that r is
decreasing (and converging to ρ) and w is increasing with y in the adjustment
path.
5.1.2 The second stage or the Uzawa-Lucas Human Capital Model
In this stage we describe a situation in which H is growing (
·
H> 0). For that
purpose we now assume that gn = 0 and then hH = (1 − u1)h. With this we
can summarize the dynamics of eqs. (19) to (21) to
gr = − [(1− β − η)/β] (r − ξ + γd) (27)
Since ∂gr/∂r < 0, the interest rate converges to ξ− γd independently of the
remaining system dynamics. From equation (10) and (18) we obtain
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gK = [(1− αη)/β] r − C/K (28)
from which, with equation (23), we can again get (26).
Then from equations (1) and (28)
gK/H = [(1− αη)/β] r − C/K − (1− u1)(ξ − γd) (29)
which is independent of K/H. From equations (20) and (21) we compute gu1 =
gK/H + gr − gw and hence after insertion of equations (24), (27) and (29) we
obtain
gu1 = [(1− α)η/β] r − C/K + (ξ − γd)u1 + [(1− η − β)/β] (ξ − γd) (30)
The system dynamic is described by the set of differential equations in r, C/K
and u1 given by (27), (26) and (30) respectively. Stationary equilibrium in this
stage is characterized by r∗ = ξ − γd, u∗1 = 1 − (ξ − γd − ρ)/(θ(ξ − γd)), and
C/K∗ = [(1−αη)/β](ξ−γd)− (ξ−γd−ρ)/θ− bn. Thus the equilibrium of this
stage is negatively affected by bad institutions: high mortality rate driven by
poor health care and sanitation services and low incentives to education, which
lead to a high influence of the mortality rate.
Notice now that the growth rate of profits is growing with GDP per capita
(see eq. (17)) but the wage (the R&D cost) is growing less than GDP per capita
(due to human capital accumulation - see eq. (21)), which is an incentive to
begin investing in R&D. The next proposition states that in equilibrium, the
economy always begin investing in R&D.13
Proposition 1 If individuals invest in human capital (which occurs if ξ−γd >
ρ), the economy will invest in R&D at some period in time.
Proof. At the steady state r is constant and, from (3), v may be calculated
as vt = pit/(ρ + p + gn). For gn = 0, this implies that gυ = gpi = gY . So, for
gH > 0, gv > gw. This implies that, though initially w > ²υ, at some period in
time we must have that w = ²υ.
5.1.3 The third stage or the Grossman-Helpman-Jones R&D Model
In this stage of development, the country is investing in all of the available
assets. For an innovative economy with knowledge accumulation, eq. (4) must
hold. Using eq. (4), equation (6) can be re-written as
gw = r + p− ²pi/w (31)
13For convergence characteristics of the Uzaca-Lucas type model we refer to literature (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, p. 184-188).
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After substitution of profits from eq.(17), wages from eq.(12) and the growth
rate of wages from eq.(24) into equation (31), we obtain the human capital share
in final good production:
u1 =
ξ − γd+ p
²
(1− β − η)
(1− α)η
n
H
(32)
This implies that gu1 = gn− gH . From this equation and eq.(21) the growth
rate of innovations can be written as gn = gY − gw. Insertion of eqs.(20) and
the last two into eq.(19) provides the growth rate of the interest rate according
to:
(1− 1− α
α
η
β
)gr = −
[
1− α
α
η
β
+
(1− β − η)
β
]
gw +
1− α
α
η
β
gK (33)
or after substituting gw and gK from equations (24) and (28),
(1− 1− α
α
η
β
)gr =
{
1− α
α
η
β
[(1− αη)/β − 1]− (1− β − η)
β
}
r−
− 1− α
α
η
β
C/K +
[
1− α
α
η
β
+
(1− β − η)
β
]
(ξ − γd) (34)
To reveal the dynamics of the knowledge formation, we define the knowledge-
ideas ratio as H/n and obtain from equations (1), (2), and (32):
gH/n = (ξ − γd) [1− ((ξ + p− γd)A2/α+ gn)(n/H)/²]− gn (35)
The dynamics of the model can be characterized by (26), (34) and (35).
Therefore we can characterize steady state as
r∗ =
θ(ξ − γd)(1 +A2)− ρ+ θbn
(θ − 1) + θA2 , (36)
C/K∗ = ρ/θ +
(
1− αη
β
− 1/θ
)
r∗ − bn (37)
which implies that
g∗n = g
∗
H = g
∗
Y − gw =
r − ρ
θ
− (r − (ξ − γd)) =
=
(ξ − γd− ρ)A2 + θA2bn
(θ − 1) + θA2 (38)
and
H/n∗ =
(ξ − γd)
²
(A2α )(ξ + p− γd) + g∗n
ξ − γd− gn∗ (39)
where A2 has been defined earlier. These steady-state equations are our initial
point for the backward-integration procedure that we explain below.14
14For convergence features, we again refer to literature (Arnold, 1998, for instance).
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5.2 Simulating the Model Economy
We now present the results of a calibration and simulation exercise of the model
presented above. In the first sub-section, we describe the simulation procedure.
In the second sub-section, we describe the benchmark calibration and departures
from this calibration. For that, we also summarize each of the extensions, for
which we present the results in the following sub-section, in which we try to
replicate the main features of world development in the last two centuries.
5.2.1 Simulation procedures
We proceed by backward integration (as described in Brunner and Strulik
(2002)) and integrate the model of economic growth described above. We begin
arbitrarily close to the steady state of the last stage (the innovative economy)
and we backward integrate the equation that describes the evolution of C/K
(26), the equation that describes the evolution of r in the same stage (34) and
that which describes the evolution of H/n (35), until we reach a value for the
share of human capital in research (Hn/H) equal to zero. At this point the
economy reaches (backward looking) the UL environment. Beginning now with
the first values for r, C/K and u1 for which Hn/H > 0, we backward integrate
the equation that describes the evolution of r in the second stage (27), (26) and
the equation that describes the evolution of the share of human capital affected
by the final good production (30), stopping when HH/H = 0. At this point the
economy reaches (backward looking) the Cass-Koopmans economy. Beginning
in the first values for r and C/K for which the share of human capital in ed-
ucation is less than one, we backward integrate the equation for the evolution
of r in the first stage (25), and the equation for the evolution of C/K in the
first stage (26) until reaching a sufficiently high value for the interest rate.15
Because this value for the interest rate affects the length of the first stage, we
have to be cautious in analyzing the length of this stage and focus only on
differences that arise from different extensions. Initial values for this variable
can, however, be adjusted without changing the following path of the economy.
Values for variables in levels (yt, ct, etc.) are obtained using the trapezoid rule,
using the respective growth rates. For practical reasons, we consider that the
economy reaches the steady state when all growth rates in the economy present
constant figures with 6 decimal digits approximation.
5.2.2 Calibration
Most parameters for our exercises were taken from Funke and Strulik (2000),
except Population Growth and Mortality rate that were borrowed from Kremer
15We have used a value of 1.7 times the value of the interest rate at the transition between
the first and the second stage. Experiments that change this and set a fixed difference between
this value and the steady state (of the last stage) value do not show significant quantitative
changes in our results. We employ a fourth-order Runge-Kutta method with variable step
control provided by Matlab. We applied a maximum discretization error of 10−11. Matlab
codes are available upon request.
18
(1993) and Jones (2001), respectively, and the sensitivity of human capital to
mortality rate (γ) is made to replicate the actual level of GDP per capita in 1998,
beginning with its actual level in 1760. We have averaged population growth rate
from 1750 and 1990 using data from Kremer (1993, Table 1), and the value for
population growth is 0.83%. This is in the same variable range showed by Jones
(2001, Table 8), which corresponds to levels of per capita consumption between
948 and 20,000. According to Jones (2001), mortality rate is between 4% and
0.7%, between 800 and 20,000 international dollars in per capita consumption.
We will assume a median value of 2%. According to Maddison (2001), GDP per
capita the industrialized world (western Europe, USA, Canada, New Zealand,
Australia and Japan) in 1760 was 1012 international 1990 dollars.16 In 1998,
according to the same source, per capita income was 21,470. In the absence
of empirical data for the probability of patent loss (p), we consider p = 0 in
the benchmark analysis, although probably the real economy has p > 0.17 We
conclude that other assumptions about p cannot crucially change the results. We
choose as the benchmark exercise the replication of per capita average growth
rate of GDP in the industrialized world. The next table summarizes parameters
for the benchmark calibration.
Table 2: Calibration for the Benchmark Analysis
Parameters Values
α 0.54
β 0.36
η 0.36
² 0.1
ξ 0.05
ρ 0.023
θ 2
d 0.02
bn 0.0083
p 0
We will consider various extensions to this calibration. We present results for
(1) the industrialized world without the first stage, (2) an economy with higher
shares of physical capital in the first stage, (3) an economy with spillovers18, (4)
16This was obtained applying the average growth rate between 1700 and 1820 (0.18%) to
GDP per capita in 1700 (907 international dollars) - Table 1-9a, p.46.
17According to current legislation, patent length is from 17 years (in USA) to 20 years
(in Europe). Using a certainty equivalence expression between the length of patents and
the erosion of monopoly probability - p - we can achieve values for p between 0.031 and
0.039. However, we lack information about the evolution of this length and the effectiveness
of legislation in past periods. It is also said that bureaucratic processes may decrease effective
protection. For our proposes, the advantage of using a total protection assumption (p = 0)
in the benchmark exercise is that effects of differences in p from an initial value of zero are
higher than from initial positive values. This is appropriate (and also more demanding for our
exercise) as we will argue that the effect of mortality is higher than that of property rights.
Results with an initial p = 0.05 (corresponds to 14 years of protection) are fairly similar to
those presented in the text, and are available upon request.
18For which a model is developed in Appendix A.
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an economy with demographic transition and (5) the evolution of the United
Kingdom economy. As we explain in greater detail below, with more detail,
extension (1) is made to avoid the arbitrary chosen initial value for the real
interest rate, extension (2) is made to replicate growth rates in the first stage,
extensions (3) and (4) to introduce important features of the real world. In
all the extensions we approximate the actual value for GDP per capita in 1998
and obtain the value of the sensitivity of human capital accumulation to the
mortality rate (γ) that fits that value. The next table summarizes changes in
parameters for each extension.
Table 3: Departures from the Benchmark Calibration
Y0 β d b
n Y1998
Benchmark 1012 0.36 0.02 0.0083 21470
Without First Stage 1049 0.36 0.02 0.0083 21470
Capital Share 1012 0.51* 0.02 0.0083 21470
Spillovers (φ = 0.2) 1012 0.36 0.02 0.0083 21470
Demographic Transition 1012 0.36 0.04; 0.04; 0.015 0.0044; 0.0057; 0.0106 21470
Notes: Y0 and Y1998 are calculated according to Maddison (2001), Y0 in the third
extension is Y1780 , the values for d and b
n in the last extension are values for the
three stages, respectively.
* The share of physical capital is only changed in the first stage.
The value for the share of physical capital in the “Capital Share” extension
was made to replicate lower growth rates in the first stage.19 In particular,
we choose β = 0.51 to replicate a zero growth rate in the last year of the first
stage. The value for spillovers was set to 0.2 because higher values are not pos-
sible in an equilibrium with human capital investment.20 For the demographic
transition, we have used data from Kremer (1993) (for the population growth)
and from Jones (2001) (for the mortality rate). For the population growth, we
have averaged figures for three periods available that we have associated with
our three stages of development: 1750-1800, 1800-1850 and 1850-1990.21 For
mortality rate, we have chosen a value of 4% for the first two stages and a value
of 1.5% for the last stage. The first value is due to Livi-Bacci (1997), which
supports that average mortality rates range as high as 4 to 5% between 1 and
1750 A.D.. Thus we choose the lower bound of this interval to roughly describe
19As for King and Rebelo (1993), this parameter has crucial importance in reaching lower
interest rates - in their case - and faster or slower convergence in the neoclassical economy.
In our case it reaches lower output growth rate but as a consequence of slow convergence, the
economy lasts longer before investing in human capital.
20Arbitrage condition between knowledge (human capital) and ideas imply that for an equi-
librium with investment in these two assets we must not have huge differences in productivities.
In fact, recent evidence which includes the effect of human capital, suggests much smaller do-
mestic - near 55% smaller - and international spillovers - from 35% to 85% smaller - than
those suggested by previous literature without human capital (Barrio-Castro et al., 2002).
21This is the possible association according to available data.
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the period between 1760 and 1780. The value for the last stage is a mean point
between the values pointed out by Jones (2001) for the periods 1950-55 and
1985-90.
5.3 Replicating the Evolution of the World Economy
Here, we want to replicate the main features of the evolution of the developed
world in the last two centuries in order to obtain a value of γ (the sensitivity of
human capital to the mortality rate) that allows for good replication results, so
that we can further use the model to compare the relative impact of mortality
rate and property rights.22 First, we show the evolution of growth rates and
other variables in our benchmark specification. Second, we show that the effect
of mortality rate on human capital accumulation is crucial for this model to
replicate the evolution of the real economy. Then, we obtain the length of each
stage and the implied value of the sensitivity of human capital accumulation to
the mortality rate in order to match the actual value of GDP per capita. We do
this for all of the extensions described above. Figure 2 summarizes the evolution
path for the benchmark economy.
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22We use γ as the instrument to mimic the real world because variations in p are not
capable of doing it. In fact, it will be shown that huge differences in p have a low influence in
transitional dynamics and on the final situation.
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Figure 2. Transition Path for the Benchmark Economy
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The evolution of the economy is characterized by a large transition before
reaching the final steady state (more than one hundred years), which mainly
occurs when agents are investing in R&D, until a steady state, in which GDP
per capita is growing at 1.1%.23 This transition represents 33% of the per capita
GDP increase until 1998. In the first stage GDP per capita growth rates are
decreasing but quite high. It is worth noting that between the second and third
stages, this growth rate increases due to research. It continues on an increasing
path until it reaches the steady state. In the first stage there is no investment in
R&D, nor in human capital. However, we see that the interest rate (panels 3 and
12) is decreasing (from an initial value of 15%) and wages are growing (panel
10), providing incentives to begin investing in human capital.24 In the second
stage, increasing GDP per capita and decreasing wages - see Panels 10 and 11
in Figure 2, about 15 years after the beginning of transition, became the main
incentives to invest in R&D, which began after nearly 40 years. Finally, a note
to say that in the second stage, human capital accumulation has two different
effects: it contributes to production of the final good and it has an opportunity
cost in terms of the final good production because some of the available human
capital is affected to increase knowledge in the economy (see panels 4 and 6 in
Figure 2).
Table 4.1. summarizes statistics for the stages’ length and final GDP in
different simulations. The First line presents the replication of Funke and Strulik
(2000) exercise: we set γ = bn = 0.25 The second line presents our benchmark
analysis (Benchmark), that was made to replicate the average evolution of GDP
per capita in all the industrialized world between 1760 and 1998. The third line
presents a simulation that begins in the second stage (roughly in 1780, by means
of comparison) - Without 1st Stage. This aims to avoid the possible arbitrary
choice of a final value of r for the simulation in the first stage. In this extension,
the implied first value for the interest rate is 10.2%. The following line (the
fourth one) shows results for a simulation in which a different physical capital
share was introduced in the first stage. As was explained, this was done in order
to reach more realistic economic growth rates in the first stage. The next two
lines show extensions in which features such as spillovers (in the fifth line) - a
model with spillovers is presented in appendix - and demographic transition -
Demo. Trans. - (in the sixth line) were introduced. In the first four columns we
show the length of transition in each stage and the total length until the steady
state. Then we show the implied value of the sensitivity of human capital
accumulation to the mortality rate (the crucial parameter γ) that was made
to replicate the actual value of GDP per capita in 1998.26 We then show the
23For the whole world, per capita growth rate between 1973 and 1992 - a period judged as
in the steady state - is 1.2% and for the industrialized world is between 1.4% (Canada, USA,
New Zealand and Australia) and 1.8% (West Europe) (figures are from Maddison (1995)).
24Some have argued that this has, in fact, taken place in eighteenth-century England (see
Lindert, 1994).
25The exercise replicates Transitional Dynamics in Funke and Strulik (2000): A Qualifica-
tion at www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/wst/strulik/fsextra.pdf.
26The chosen gama (γ) is the two-decimal-points number that turns the predicted GDP per
capita as close as possible to the actual one.
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predicted GDP per capita in 1998, the proportion of GDP increase verified in
transition in overall increase in GDP until 1998 and finally, the first year the
economy reaches the steady state.
Table 4.2. summarizes results for growth rates of GDP per capita in the
middle and at the end of different stages, for all the cited simulations.
Table 4.1: Features of Model Economies - replication of actual levels of development
Transition (Stages) γ GDP p. c. % GDP in First year
1st 2nd 3rd Total 1998 transition in SS
FS (2000) 15.4 19.1 62.9 97.4 0 116180 7.6 1857
Benchmark 12.7 26.2 98.4 137.3 0.76 21737 32.9 1897
W. 1st Stage – 23.6 91.3 114.9 0.56 21222 24.2 1875
Capital Share 55.8 30.4 131.6 217.8 0.99 21543 66.5 1978
Spillovers 12.7 52.9 68.6 134.2 0.80 21161* 31.1 1894
Demo. Trans. 15.6 8.6 96.1 120.3 1.03 21287 25.3 1880
Notes: Numbers are in years, with the exception of those in the columns for γ and
GDP p.c., which is in 1990 international dollars.
*Figures for GDP per capita in these cases are approximate, as growth rates are not
constant in 1998.
Table 4.2: Features of Model Economies - growth rates
Growth Rates (Stages)
1st 2nd 3rd
Middle End Middle End Middle End
FS (2000) 4.3% 3.2% 1.8% 1.4% 1.8% 1.8%
Benchmark 4.4% 3.3% 1.2% 0.7% 1.1% 1.1%
Since 1780 – – 1.5% 0.9% 1.4% 1.4%
Capital Share 3.0% 0% 0.9% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8%
Spillovers 4.4% 3.3% 0.8% -0.2% 1.1% 1.1%
Demo. Trans. 3.8% 3.1% -0.1% -0.8% 1.2% 1.2%
Note: all growth rates are rounded to one decimal point. Middle values are the
median time point for each stage.
These tables show some interesting and important results. First of all, the
introduction of the mortality rate effect on human capital productivity is crucial
to replicating actual economic history over the last two and a half centuries
regarding average growth rate of per capita GDP. The exclusion of this feature,
as we show in the first line (Table 4.1.), considering γ = 0 and zero growth rate
of population, would lead to an unrealistic per capita GDP in any country in
the world. In fact, until now, literature (Funke and Strulik (2000) and King
and Rebelo (1993), for instance) wants to replicate steady-state growth rates
(in the last period) but this procedure is far from replicating actual trajectories
in models with large transition paths, as it is shown here. The presence of a
setting with the effect of the mortality rate on human capital accumulation and
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population growth increases the transition path from 97 to 137 years by means
of increasing the second and third stages’ transition length, implying that the
economy reached the steady state in 1897, 40 years later. This also sharply
increases the proportion of output growth that is verified when economy is in
transition: from 7.6% to 33%.
Second, for all the simulations, the model replicates relatively small stages of
capital accumulation.27 This means that our model fits historians’ beliefs about
the increasing role of R&D in developing economies (see Maddison, 1995 and
Crafts, 1995 and 1996). This is seen particularly in the benchmark case (the
industrialized world), where first, second stage and total length are shorter than
in the UK extension, due to better human capital institutions in the industri-
alized world that also lead to higher growth rate in the steady state. However,
once the economy begins investing in R&D, a fast approximation to the steady
state takes place in the first years of the third stage. This is easily seen by
observing growth rates in the last two columns of Table 4.2. These growth rates
are consistent with the real ones, for the industrialized world between 1973 and
1992: 1.4%. It is also from Table 4.2. that the most unrealistic model feature
is shown: growth rates in the first stage are particularly high when compared
to available data. This problem may come from two sources: (1) the selected
value for final interest rate for simulation or (2) the period of the first stage
in the model is shorter than the actual one. Our experiments have shown that
changes of the assumed final interest rate do not affect final growth rates but
only the period length. The second reason, however, may lead to a mismatch
between the available figures and model predictions for the first period length,
which are, in some simulations, slightly smaller when compared with historical
descriptions. Real figures may include part of the second period in the model.
As we show in the fourth line of Table 4.2., only an increase in the physical cap-
ital share in the first period could account for this, as is the case also in King
and Rebelo (1993). As Table 4.1. (fourth line) shows, this, however, increases
the length of the first stage. This approximates the growth rate of per capita
GDP to that suggested by Crafts (1995) as an average for the period between
1760 and 1780 (0.6%), although it continues to present quite a high value for
growth in the beginning of the period.
Moreover, under a wide range for the parameter γ, we were able to replicate
actual levels of GDP per capita (or average growth rates). The different values
for this parameter depended on the underlying assumption for the other param-
eters, i.e., the existence of demographic transition, a different share of capital
in the first stage or the existence of spillovers, for instance.
To sum up, it is advisable to think that the real value for γ is between 0.5 and
1 in the set of industrialized countries considered. More important than this, is
the conclusion according to which this parameter is not only important to repli-
27These lengths are in the range suggested by economic historians: from 20 to 50 years for
the first stage and between 9 and 50 years for the second (see, for instance, Crafts (1995)
and the WP version of this work). However, from the two first stages, only the second is
“endogenous”: simulation reports smaller values for the upper bound of the suggested interval
for this stage.
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cate average growth rates during the last two centuries, but also has important
effects in development differences today. This may contribute to easily explain
the differences between development in the industrialized world (and particu-
larly in the USA) and United Kingdom today, linking those differences to human
capital institutions, as was also noted by economic historians (Crafts, 1995 and
Mokyr, 1990 are just examples). Beginning with a difference in GDP per capita
that favored the latter (of around 700 international dollars), a difference in the
sensitivity of the human capital to the mortality rate of less than 30% (from 0.76
to 0.97) may account for the overcoming of the former set of countries. As we
had interpreted this parameter as the quality of institutions that protect human
capital accumulation, such as health and welfare services, education system, and
civil or public order, these may have crucial importance in determining devel-
opment differences today. As this effect has proven to be relevant in replicating
paths of development and explaining differences of development, the next step
is to compare the impact of this feature with an alternative and well-known
explanation for different paths and levels of development: property-rights for
ideas (varieties).
As the first stage remains with some contrafactual implications (as was rec-
ognized by King and Rebelo, 1993), for this propose we will use the Extension
“Without First Stage” for the following analysis.28
6 Comparing Mortality rate with Property Rights
In this section we compare the relative importance of human capital protective
institutions with R&D protective institutions. In particular, we compare the
impact of variations in the sensitivity of human capital to the mortality rate
and the impact of differences on property rights, both in consumption and in
welfare. With this propose, we calculate an index of consumption two hundred
years after the beginning (we normalized the initial value for consumption in the
“Without First Stage” case to one and set the obtained final value to 100) and
an index of utility. This last index is calculated as U0 =
∫∞
0
c1−θt
1−θ e
−(ρ−bn)τdτ
(using the trapezoid rule). We do not impose any initial conditions, although
we consider K fixed across simulations.29 This exercise answers the question:
how the industrialized world must have behaved if institutions in place in the
economy were different; say the economy had better or worse protection to
human capital or to R&D. Table 6.1 shows results for the “Without First Stage”
simulation (with γ = 0.56), for worse human capital institutions (with γ =
0.784), for erosion of monopoly power (MP) (with p = 0.5, which means that
the probability of a new variety still being monopolized in the next period is
28It can be shown that the use of the benchmark exercise does not affect the crucial result
in the paper. However, we believe that beginning with the second stage improves the fit of
our results to reality. Results for the benchmark exercise are shown in Appendix C - Table
1.C.
29Results do not change if C is considered fixed across simulations. The normalization of
initial consumption to one does not change our conclusions.
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about 60%) and for the absence of property-rights law and enforcement - No PR
(which implies that the third stage does not exist). Table 6.2 adds information
about the importance of transitional dynamics in the model.
Table 6.1: Comparing the influence of Mortality Rate with Property Rights
Transition (Stages) γ C U0
2nd 3rd Total
W. First Stage 23.6 91.3 114.9 0.56 100 100
Worse HC-I. 26.7 94.3 121.0 0.784 47.0 18.5
Erosion MP 21.3 91.9 113.2 0.56 87.6 95.7
No PR 368.8 – 368.8 0.56 45.8 7.3
Notes: Numbers are in years, with the exception of those in the columns for γ, C
and U.
Table 6.2: Proportion of transitional dynamics
% C 1998 % Utility
in transition in transition
W. First Stage 31.3 3.9
Worse HC-I. 43.3 16.0
Erosion MP 30.6 3.6
No PR 100.0 73.7
Table 6.1 shows that both types of incentives (linked to human capital ac-
cumulation or linked to property rights) have dramatic effects on growth and
development. More precisely, a difference of 40% (from γ = 0.56 to γ = 0.784) in
the sensitivity of human capital accumulation to the death rate (or in the death
rate, given the sensitivity) imply a greater than 1/2 decrease in consumption per
capita and utility. A higher parameter leads again to lengthier second-stages,
where the economy is growing due to human and physical capital investment,
to lengthier transition paths, lower welfare and also to a greater importance
of transition dynamics in explaining actual consumption per capita and util-
ity, as shown in Table 6.2. These last results suggest that the importance of
transitional dynamics increases as institutions’ quality decreases.
If the country had not set up a property rights system to protect new ideas,
it could only grow due to human and physical capital accumulation. This would
lead to a per capita consumption nearly 50% lower than otherwise. This means
that these institutional differences can well account for huge welfare and con-
sumption differences. It is worth noting that the absence of property rights leads
to a lengthier transition and consequently, to its greater weight in explaining
actual consumption and utility.30 However, the erosion of monopoly power, i.e.,
the probability of a good to lose the protective power of the patent shows a lower
30This seems to conclude that the “steady state need not be the full story about the growth
of nations” (King and Rebelo, 1993: 914) and adds the evidence that the importance of
transitional dynamics crucially depends on incentives (and institutions) being in place in the
economy.
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influence in the final level of development and does not influence growth rates.
This happens because in this model agents can re-allocate their human capital
effort between three different uses: final good, education and research. When
property rights are not secure (although an institutional patenting system set
up does exist), people allocate more effort to other activities than research. For
instance, in the “Without First Stage” economy (at the innovative stage steady
state) the decentralized economy allocates 10% of human capital to research
and development. When the insecurity in monopoly power is of 40%, as it is
in the third line of Table 6, the economy only allocates 0.8% of human capital
to research and it chooses a much higher steady-state knowledge-ideas ratio.
This however does not affect growth rates, and the overall performance of the
economy is slightly weaker than it was before.
The mortality rate and human capital protective institutions have a greater
impact than that of property rights on final consumption per capita and welfare.
Four results support this conclusion. First, there is not any number for p <∞
that allows for the replication of the actual final value of GDP per capita, with a
value of γ = 0, this is, although the impact of the mortality rate in human capital
accumulation is capable of replicating average performance of the industrialized
world in the last two and a half centuries (see Table 4.1), the erosion of monopoly
power is not! Second, the same percent variations in institutions’ quality implies
that differences in final consumption per capita and welfare are lower when the
differences are obtained due to variations in R&D protective institutions than
when they are obtained due to variations in human capital protective institutions
(compare the first line with the last one and the second with the third lines in
Table 7). Third, an increase in γ of 75% (from 0.56 to 0.98) is equivalent to
the absence of property rights in terms of welfare. Fourth, a value of γ = 1.35
(an increase of 141%) that avoids investment in human capital - this is what
happened to R&D investments in the “No PR” extension - would lead to no
growth at all, and thus to a difference of 99% in consumption and 100% in
utility.
We may wonder that the possible presence of spillovers in R&D changes this
result. However, as Table 7 indicates, the presence of spillovers does not dismiss
our result.
In Table 7, we compare the same differences in R&D protection (that is, a
difference in the probability of a good to be monopolized at a given moment) -
e−p - and in the sensitivity of human capital to the mortality rate - γ. As these
measures are in different units (the first is a probability and the second measure
impact), we standardize the analysis using percentage differences.31
31However, even differences could be calculated in a different way: instead of using variations
in e−p to measure percentage differences in R&D protective institutions, we could have used
variations in p, instead. In fact, e−p and γ have different intervals. Although the first is
bounded in 100%, the latter is not upper bounded. It is worth noting that using that variable,
we are more demanding on the comparative mortality rate influence. In fact, a 40% variation
in an initial value of p leads to a smaller variation in p than the same variation in e−p, and
an even smaller impact of R&D was obtained.
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Table 7: Welfare losses due to Worst Property Rights and Higher Mortality
Parameter changes % difference Spillovers
in quality Without (φ = 0) With (φ = 0.2)
of institutions C U C U
No PR e−p (from 1 to 0) 100% 54% 93% – –
Erosion MP e−p (from 1 to 0.6) 40% 12.4% 4.3% 14.8% 4.2%
Worse HC-I 1 γ (from 0.56 to 0.784) 40% 53% 82% 54% 95%
Worse HC-I 2 γ (from 0.56 to 0.98) 75% 76% 93% 77% 98%
Worse HC-I 3 γ (from 0.56 to 1.12) 100% 86% 97% 87% 99%
These experiments show that this environment attributes a much weaker
role to intellectual property rights than Jones (2001) or Kortum (1997), for
instance. However, the link between human capital and R&D suggests that
the human capital protective institutions are also protective for R&D. If human
capital protective institutions are so bad that human capital accumulation is
not possible, R&D will not occur. Thus, R&D is also dependent on institutions
linked to human capital. This can be seen in the “Worse HC Institutions”
extension, where R&D is delayed due to high sensitivity of human capital to
the mortality rate.
The following figure (Figure 3) shows the evolution of per capita consumption
index according to the differing protection given to human capital and R&D
presented in Table 7. It compares the “Without First Stage” extension with
“Erosion MP”, “Worse HC-I 1” and “No Property Rights”. This is interesting
because it clearly shows the greater influence of “Worse HC-I” extensions. It is
also worth noting that decreasing Property Rights has a higher relative impact
after some years, but lower impact earlier on. For instance, for the “No PR”
case, consumption is higher in the first periods and after 200 years it may
become worse than the worse human capital institutions case. This fact will
have a crucial effect on utility, as this “Worse HC-I 1” (γ=0.784) extension
yields higher welfare than the “No Property Rights” extension. As Table 7
illustrated, a somewhat higher effect of mortality (γ=0.98) - which we did not
depict in the figure for reasons of clarity - is needed to equalize the welfare effect
of this extension.
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Figure 3. Evolution of per capita Consumption in two-stage economies with
different institution qualities
7 An institutions-improving State
Is the State important to build and enforce institutions that affect growth and
development? A number of studies have explored the empirical connection be-
tween measures of political stability and bureaucratic competence, on the one
hand, and rates of economic growth, on the other.32 There is some evidence
that a stable and competent state is indeed a contributing factor in economic
growth. Recently, Bockstette et al. (2002) discovered that state antiquity con-
tributes significantly to differences in growth rates and is also a good instrument
for “social infrastructure”.33 However, questions like: “how much tax should be
supported to held appropriate institutions for growth?” and consequently “how
important is a tax collector and institutions-builder and enforcing government
to economic growth theory?” are questions without answers until now. Our
32See, for instance, Alesina et al. (1996) and Mauro (1995)
33In England, for instance, during the industrial revolution, taxes went up sixteen times
between 1688 and 1815, particularly in war times. However, it can be argued that most of the
money seems well spent because between 1688 and 1815 no invasions of the homeland took
place, and also foreign aggression to British commerce and territories overseas declined in
significance. Although persons and property were not effectively protected against crime and
violence, the Hanoverian authorities certainly became more prepared to repress all challenges
to good order and social stability during the eighteenth century (O’Brien, 1994).
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model is appropriate to answer these questions. On the one hand, it encom-
passes the most important economic growth models in a coherent endogenous
setting (due to Funke and Strulik (2000)) and on the other, its results show a
crucial importance of different types of institutions to the development of the
world.
In this section we will assume the existence of a Government which enforces
institutions (education, health, sanitation and property rights), through a tax
rate on asset income.34 As in Peretto (2003), the most effective tax is the one
on the asset income (ra). However, due to the fact that it is the productivity of
human capital accumulation that determines growth, no usual tax has effects on
the steady-state growth rates (as in Arnold, 1998). In the transition, our exper-
iments showed that the tax on asset income is quantitatively more important
than that on the human capital income (w(H −HH)). Because of that and for
simplicity of calculations, we use only the first tax. This tax introduced at time
0 will decrease the net interest rate at this period, keeping the stock of physical
capital unchangeable but allowing for instantaneous “jumps” in consumption.35
We calculate the amount the representative agent is willing to pay for the
enforcement of high-quality institutions. The assumption in doing this is that
the tax returns are spent on keeping the quality of institutions (maintaining
quality of schools, justice and health) and that otherwise quality will decrease
by some given amount.36 We show results for maintaining quality of institutions
when compared with a fall of 30%, 40% and 100% in their quality.37
Table 8: Increase in the Quality of Institutions Equivalent to given tax rates
Increase Ad-Valoren Tax on Wealth Ad-Valoren Tax on Wealth
in Education/Health Quality for HC Institutions for R&D Institutions
% γ* p**
30% 52.2% 1.0%
40% 71.8% 1.2%
100% 80.0% 79.7%
Notes: *30% and 40% are equivalent to a change from γ=0.56 to γ=0.728
and to γ=0.784, respectively.
** 30% and 40% are equivalent to a change from p=0 to p=0.36
and to p=0.50, respectively.
It becomes clear that agents are willing to pay high taxes over wealth in
order to maintain institutions at high levels.38 More important than this is
34By assumption, Government keeps a balanced budget each period. Taxes are only spent
on enforcing institutions. The model is developed in Appendix A.
35To account for that, we fixed the r0 at 6.5%.
36A lump-sum tax gives trivial results, because it has no growth effects.
37With high tax rates, the economy does not have transitional dynamics. These taxes are
calculated at the steady state.
38These high values for tax rates are due to low influence of taxation in this model, as
Arnold (1998) pointed out.
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the fact that agents are willing to pay higher taxes to enforce human capital
protective institutions than to enforce R&D institutions. This confirms our
previous conclusions on the greater impact of human capital (HC) institutions
- linked with the impact of mortality - than that of R&D institutions - linked
with the protection of new ideas.
8 Conclusions
We show that the influence of mortality rate on human capital accumulation,
recently established in the economic literature (e.g. Zhang et al. (2001), Zhang
et al. (2003), and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000)), is very important for a set
of established growth models to encompass recent economic history. This can
easily replicate the final difference in per capita income between countries.
We add to the economic literature linked with the industrial revolution (e.g.
Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), McDermott (2002), Lucas (1993), Jones
(2001), Gollin et al. (2002) and Hansen and Prescott (2002)) the particular
interest with the “second-type” industrial revolution, linked with the transition
to an R&D-intensive stage. Once the economy has begun to invest in human
capital, it will, at some point in time, experience a second type industrial revo-
lution. We have drawn the economic path of the economy for the last 250 years
using the most well-known models of economic growth. We have concluded that
the R&D last stage is the lengthiest one and that the transition is important in
explaining GDP, consumption and welfare. Its importance is crucially depen-
dent on institutions in the economy. This enriches the usual characterization of
“modern times” as “Solow” times (as in Hansen and Prescott (2002)).
The main contribution of the paper, which adds to recent theoretical treat-
ment of incentives and property-rights (North (1994), Jones (2001), Kortum
(1997), Lindner and Strulik (2004) and some of the cited above), is the compar-
ison between the influence of the mortality rate and property rights, respectively
linked with “expropriation” of human capital and patents, on growth and devel-
opment. Contrary to most previous work, we conclude that, quantitatively, the
sensitivity of human capital to the mortality rate and the mortality rate itself
(which can be identified with public provision of education, health, sanitation,
medication and so on) has a more dramatic influence on development than do
property rights. Moreover, we argue for the potential important role of Govern-
ments as institution builders. This is shown because agents are willing to pay
high tax rates to maintain high-level institutions.
Future research may proceed in three different and potentially fruitful direc-
tions. First, it should pay attention to the important institutions that enhance
human capital accumulation in different sets of countries, which can also be
viewed as institutions necessary to R&D. Second, it may study mechanisms
that could increase the influence of erosion of monopoly power in the economy,
such as adaptation costs (or contracts) between sectors, for instance. Finally, it
may develop more focused settings to analyze the role of Government in building
and improving institutions.
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9 Appendix
A Model with Government
Government uses taxes on physical capital and human capital income to enforce
institutions and keeps a balanced budget from period to period. Thus the
35
Government spends tax income on building institutions. The physical capital
tax changes equation (10) to include a smaller private net return on capital,
r = (1− τk)βY
K
, (40)
where τk is a tax on physical capital which first affects gK . We can re-write (18)
as
·
K= (1− αη)Y − C − τk βY
K
K (41)
Naturally, all equations in the model previously affected by (18) will now be
affected by (41). In particular, using (40) and (41), equations that characterize
the first stage (25) and (26), can be restated as:
gr = −1− β − η1− η
(
1
(1− τk)
(
1− αη
β
− τk
)
r − C/K
)
(42)
and
gC/K =
(
1/θ − 1
(1− τk)
(
1− αη
β
− τk
))
r + C/K − ρ/θ + bn. (43)
It is well-known in the literature that this type of tax has a level effect in a
Ramsey-type model, decreasing the value of the equilibrium physical capital. In
the period that the tax is introduced, net interest rate decreases by the value of
(1− τk).
B Model with Spillovers
We have considered an R&D function used in Jones (1995)
·
n= ²Hnnφ, which
implies that the free-entry condition in R&D will be written as υnφ = w² .
The following expressions substitute expressions in the third stage of devel-
opment:
u1 =
ξ − γd+ φgn + p
²
(1− β − η)
(1− α)η
n1−φ
H
(44)
This implies that gu1 = (1− φ)gn − gH . From this equation and eq.(21) the
growth rate of innovations can be written as gn = gY −gw1−φ . Insertion of eqs.(20)
and the last two into eq.(19) provides growth rate of the interest rate according
to:
(1− 1− α
α
η
β
1
1− φ )gr = −
[
1− α
α
η
β
1
1− φ +
(1− β − η)
β
]
gw+
+
1− α
α
η
β
1
1− φgK (45)
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After substituting gw and gK from equations (24) and (28), the last equation
can be re-written as,
(1− 1− α
α
η
β
1
1− φ )gr =
{
1− α
α
η
β
1
1− φ [(1− αη)/β − 1]−
(1− β − η)
β
}
r−
− 1− α
α
η
β
1
1− φC/K +
[
1− α
α
η
β
1
1− φ +
(1− β − η)
β
]
(ξ − γd)
(46)
To reveal the dynamics of the knowledge formation, we define the knowledge-
ideas ratio as H/n1−φ and obtain from equations (2), (1) and (32)
gH/n = (ξ − γd) [1− ((ξ + φgn + p− γd)A2/α+ gn)/H/n²]− gn(1− φ) (47)
The dynamics of the model can be characterized by (26), (46) and (47).
Therefore, we can characterize steady state as
r∗ =
θ(ξ − γd)(1 +A2)− ρ+ θbn
(θ − 1) + θA2 , (48)
C/K∗ = ρ/θ +
(
1− αη
β
− 1/θ
)
rs − bn (49)
which implies that
g∗n =
(ξ − γd− ρ)A2 + θA2bn
((θ − 1) + θA2)(1− φ) (50)
and
H/n∗ =
(ξ − γd)
²
(1− β − η)(ξ + φgn + p− γd)/[(1− α)η] + g∗n
ξ − γd− (1− φ)gn∗ (51)
where A2 =
α(1−β−η)
(1−α)η (1− φ).
C Comparing Mortality Rate with Property Rights
- Benchmark
Table 1.C: Welfare losses due to Worst Property Rights and Higher Mortality
Parameter changes % decrease Spillovers
in quality Without (φ = 0) With (φ = 0.2)
of institutions C U C U
No PR e−p (from 1 to 0) 100% 54.0% 73.6% – –
Worst PR e−p (from 1 to 0.6) 40% 15.1% 4.4% 27.4% 4.8%
Higher Mort. γ (from 0.76 to 1.064) 40% 70.7% 68.6% 73.5% 74.0%
Higher Mort. γ (from 0.76 to 1.11) 46% 75.8% 73.6% 77.3% 78.1%
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